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USING LIFE EXPECTANCY TABLES
FOR PRIVATE ANNUITIES
— by Neil E. Harl*
Private annuities are entered into for a variety of
reasons.1 Some annuitants seek a stream of income that will
continue until death of the annuitant — or annuitant and
spouse under a joint and survivor annuity; others are moved
by a desire to transfer significant assets such as farmland to
someone in the next generation as obligor.
Another reason driving interest in private annuities is the
motivation to enter into annuity arrangements after the onset
of serious illness that has likely diminished life expectancy.
If the obligor or obligors are family members, the result can
be indeed favorable in terms of overall family wealth if the
outcome is transfer of the property funding the private
annuity for one or, at most, a few payments.
A set of new income tax, gift tax and estate tax
regulations effective with respect to decedents dying after
December 13, 1995 2 has altered the guidelines for
determining when use of the life expectancy tables is
appropriate.
"Death is imminent" rule
For many years, the question of when use of the life
expectancy tables was appropriate has been made under a
"death is imminent" rule.3 Under that approach, the IRS
position emphasized a facts and circumstances test —
"...The current actuarial tables in the regulations
shall be applied if valuation of an individual's life
interest is required for purposes of the federal estate or
gift taxes unless the individual is known to have been
afflicted, at the time of transfer, with an incurable
physical condition that is in such an advanced stage
that death is clearly imminent. Death is not clearly
imminent if there is a reasonable possibility of survival
for more than a very brief period. For example, death
is not clearly imminent if the individual may survive
for a year or more and if such a possibility is not so
remote as to be negligible. If the evidence indicates
that the decedent will survive for less than a year, no
inference should be drawn that death will be regarded
as clearly imminent, because this question depends on
all the facts and circumstances."4
An earlier ruling, Rev. Rul. 66-307,5 involved the
valuation of property interests for purposes of the credit for
_____________________________________________________
*
 Charles F. Curtiss Distinguished Professor in Agriculture and
Professor of Economics, Iowa State University; member of the
Iowa Bar.
tax on prior transfers.6 In the facts of that ruling, the life
tenant-transferee was "afflicted with a ravaging and
incurable disease of advanced state and could not survive a
year." Indeed, the life tenant survived the transfer by less
than four months. The life estate in the estate of the
transferor had an actuarial value of about 52 percent but the
life tenant received in benefits before death only about one
percent of the value of the property.7 That ruling concluded
that if it is known on the valuation date that a life tenant is
afflicted with a fatal and incurable disease in its advanced
stages and the individual cannot survive for more than a
brief period of time, the value of the life or remainder
interest should be determined "by reference to such known
facts."8
The "new" approach
A 1993 Tax Court case, Estate of McClendon v.
Commissioner,9 involved a taxpayer with an actuarial life
expectancy of 15-years but who was suffering from a severe
form of throat cancer. The court agreed that a substantially
diminished life expectancy justified departure from the
annuity tables.10 A "savings" clause in a private annuity
entered into by the taxpayer provided for an adjustment if
challenged.11 That clause was disregarded as against public
policy.12
In late 1995, I.R.S. indicated that amendments to the
income tax,13 gift tax14 and estate tax15 regulations had
superseded the two governing revenue rulings, Rev. Rul. 80-
80,16 and Rev. Rul. 66-307,17 effective for estates of
decedents dieing after December 13, 1995.18
Under the amendments to the regulations, the life
expectancy tables and standard interest rate rules may not be
used if an individual (who is a measuring life) dies or is
terminally ill at the time the transfer is completed.19 An
individual who is known to have an incurable illness "or
other deteriorating physical condition" is considered
terminally ill if there is at least a 50 percent probability that
the individual will die within one year.20 However, if the
individual survives for 18 months or longer after the date the
transfer is completed, the individual is presumed to have not
been terminally ill at the date the transfer was completed.21
That presumption can be overcome only by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary.22
The regulations provide an example of how the
regulatory language is to be applied —
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"The donor transfers property worth $1,000,000 to a
child in exchange for the child's promise to pay the
donor $103,000 per year for the donor's life. The donor
is age 60 but has been diagnosed with an incurable
illness and has at least a 50 percent probability of
dying within 1 year. The section 7520 interest rate for
the month of the transfer is 10.6 percent, and the
standard annuity factor at that interest rate for a person
age 60 in normal health is 7.4230. Thus, if the donor
were not terminally ill, the present value of the annuity
would be $764,569 ($103,000 x 7.4230). Assuming the
presumption provided (in Treas. Reg. § 25.7520-
3(b)(2)) does not apply, because there is at least a 50
percent probability that the donor will die within 1
year, the standard section 7520 annuity factor may not
be used to determine the present value of the donor's
annuity interest. Instead, a special section 7520 annuity
factor must be computed that takes into account the
projection of the donor's actual life expectancy."23
In conclusion
The key provision in the new regulatory language is the
50 percent probability of death within on year.24 That is a
substantially different rule from the "death is imminent"
standard applicable previously.25
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtors had signed-up for
the 1988 farm programs for their rice and wheat crops. The
debtors had received an advance disaster payment for the
rice crop. Although the debtors eventually applied for full
disaster payments, the USDA denied all disaster payments
based on the failure of the debtors to follow normal cultural
practices in growing the rice. After the debtors filed for
Chapter 12, the USDA set off the advance disaster payment
for the rice crop against disaster payments owed to the
debtors for the wheat crop losses. The USDA did not
petition for relief from the automatic stay before the setoff.
The court ruled that the setoff violated the automatic stay
and the debtors sought an award of attorney's fees for
challenging the setoff. The court awarded about one-third of
the claimed fees at a rate of $90.00 per hour. The court
noted that the USDA was primarily responsible for the
protracted nature of the proceedings. In re Winchester, 191
B.R. 93 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1995).
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS . The debtor was a
producer of soybean seed and had contracted with a dealer
to produce soybean seed from foundation seed owned by the
dealer. The debtor also contracted with several growers to
grow the seed. The debtor was to receive a premium on each
bushel of seed delivered to the dealer and paid a premium to
the growers out of the premium received from the dealer.
The debtor lost its state grain license and its business was
operated under the state Department of Agriculture for the
purpose of winding up the debtor's affairs. Although most of
the contract had been performed by the time the debtor filed
for bankruptcy, several payments were made within 90 days
prior to the filing. The payments were made to the state
Department of Agriculture and were not part of the debtor's
bankruptcy estate. The trustee sought to recover those
payments as either fraudulent or preferential. The trustee
alleged that the seed contract with the dealer was void
because it was not written as required by Ill. Cod. Stat. ch.
505, § 105/1. The court held that the statute did not provide
that an unwritten contract was void but only provided
penalties for failing to put a seed contract in writing. The
trustee also argued that the payments were preferential. The
court held that the payments were made in the ordinary
course of business as part of the contract. In re Ostrom-
Martin, Inc., 191 B.R. 126 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1996).
ESTATE PROPERTY. The debtor owned a tax
deferred annuity contract which was tax qualified under
I.R.C. § 403(b). The annuity contained a spendthrift clause
which was effective under state law. The court held that the
annuity contract was not estate property under Section
541(c)(2). In re Johnson, 191 B.R. 75 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
1996).
